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FIFRA AND PREEMPTION: CAN STATE
COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL
REGULATIONS COEXIST? PAPAS v.
UPJOHN CO., 926 F.2d 1019
(11th Cir. 1991)
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)l
governs the use, regulation, and labeling of pesticides2 in the United
States.3 FIFRA grants states the authority to regulate the sale and use
of pesticides4 to the extent that regulation does not conflict with the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)5 exclusive authority to reg-
ulate labeling and packaging.6 Although FIFRA clearly establishes ex-
clusive federal control over labeling and packaging at the expense of
state authority,7 courts differ when determining whether FIFRA simi-
larly preempts' common law tort claims9 brought against manufactur-
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
2. The Act defines a pesticide as: "(1) any substance or mixture of substances in-
tended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any sub-
stance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or
desiccant." 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1988).
3. See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text for a historical background of
FIFRA.
4. "A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or
device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale
or use prohibited by this subchapter." 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988).
5. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of Congress'
intent in implementing FIFRA and the role of the EPA.
6. A "State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter." 7
U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
7. Id.
8. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is the basis upon which federal pre-
emption over state law rests. The clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
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ers for inadequate labeling.1" In Papas v. Upjohn Co.," the Eleventh
Circuit held that FIFRA impliedly preempts12 state common law tort
claims for inadequate labeling.13
In Papas, the plaintiff alleged that inadequate labeling of pesticides
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The doctrine of preemption addresses the distribution of regulatory power between
the federal and state governments when their efforts overlap. The Supreme Court has
outlined the circumstances under which federal law will preempt state law. First, Con-
gress may explicitly state that the federal law will preempt all state regulation in the
field. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). Second, preemption
will exist in cases where compliance with both federal and state law is impossible. Id.
Third, the state law may not act as an obstacle to the goals of the federal law. Id.
However, there is a presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt the state law.
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). For a general survey of the doctrine
of preemption, see generally Marilyn P. Westerfield, Note, Federal Preemption and the
FDA, What Does Congress Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 263, 264-69 (1989) (discussing
the circumstances which constitute implied and express preemption under the
Supremacy Clause).
9. See Mary Lee A. Howarth, Comment, Preemption and Punitive Damages: The
Conflict Continues Under FIFRA, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1301, 1303 (1988) (noting the
controversial and inconsistent cases regarding preemption of punitive damages issues).
10. Id The author asserts that courts are unsettled in deciding failure-to-warn tort
suits in light of FIFRA's comprehensive scheme governing labeling. Id. Courts have
similarly disagreed on other preemption issues based upon FIFRA. See D-Con Co. v.
Allenby, 728 F. Supp. 605, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that FIFRA does not pre-
empt California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act to the extent that
the California Act merely imposed restrictions on pesticide sale or use by posting re-
strictions in designated "safe harbors"). But see Professional Lawn Care Ass'n v. Vil-
lage of Milford, 909 F.2d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 1990) (FIFRA preempts local ordinance
requiring pesticide users to post public notices prior to and during use); Maryland Pest
Control Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 646 F. Supp. 109, 113 (D. Md. 1986) (FIFRA
held to preempt posting and notice requirements contained in county ordinances with
respect to use of pesticides), aff'd, 822 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1987) (decision without pub-
lished opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990). The Supreme Court put this issue
to rest in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2487 (1991) (FIFRA
does not preempt local government ordinance regulating the use of pesticides).
11. 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991), petition for cert filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3825 (U.S.
May 29, 1991) (No. 90-1837).
12. See infra note 35 for a discussion on how courts infer preemption of a state law
from a statute or regulation.
13. 926 F.2d at 1024. Actions which establish "labeling" present a separate issue.
See, eg., New York State Pesticide Coalition v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115, 119-20 (2d. Cir.
1989) (holding that a state statute's requirement that commercial pesticide applicators
take certain steps to warn the immediate purchasers and general public of pesticide
dangers did not constitute "labeling" pesticides and, therefore, was not preempted by
FIFRA).
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manufactured by the defendant led to his serious health problems.14
The pesticide manufacturer moved for partial summary judgment, ar-
guing that FIFRA, under which its product is registered, preempted
the plaintiff's common law tort claims. 5 The district court granted
the defendant's motion 16 and appeal was immediately granted. 7 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court and con-
cluded that FIFRA preempts state common law tort claims for inade-
quate labeling. 8
In 1947, Congress enacted FIFRA "for the protection of users, con-
sumers and the general public."19 In 1972, Congress restructured
FIFRA and transferred implementation authority to the EPA20 in an
effort to cure initial shortcomings which made FIFRA unworkable. 2
The revitalized Act provided the EPA with direct control over pesti-
14. 926 F.2d at 1020. The complaint alleged negligence, strict liability and breach
of implied merchantability on the part of the defendant pesticide manufacturer. Id.
15. Id. at 1020-21. For a discussion of preemption as a defense, see generally
Georgene M. Vairo, Survey of Recent Tort Preemption Cases, 491 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 871
(1990).
16. 926 F.2d at 1020-21.
17. L at 1021. The district court noted that the FIFRA preemption issue involved
a controlling question of law, warranting substantial grounds for difference of opinion.
Id See infra notes 28-29 for cases that illustrate the split of authority concerning
FIFRA's preemption of state tort claims.
18. Id. at 1024-25 (holding that because the federal government occupies the entire
field of labeling regulation, states have no room to supplement federal law through state
common law tort actions).
19. See S. REP. No. 92-838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 3999. Federal control over pesticides began in 1910 with passage
of the Federal Insecticide Act which "prevented the manufacture, sale or transportation
of adulterated or misbranded insecticides and fungicides and authorized regulation of
sales of insecticides and fungicides." Id. Because the number and variety of pesticides
increased in both manufacture and use, Congress saw the need for more comprehensive
and uniform laws to regulate registration, labels and use. Id See generally Howarth,
supra note 9, at 1320-21 (discussing the historical development of pesticide regulation
and FIFRA and asserting that Congress intended FIFRA to preempt state regulation of
pesticide packaging and labeling).
20. H.R. REP. No. 100-939, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3474, 3476.
21. Id. The dangers of pesticides and the shortcomings of the previous pesticide
regulation system were highly publicized after the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent
Spring in 1964. Id. at 3475-76. For example, some of the Act's problems included: (1)
its failure to control the actual use of pesticides; and (2) "protest registration" which
authorized manufacturers to market a pesticide in spite of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture's refusal to register it. Id at 3476.
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cide labeling,2 2 as well as registration of manufacturing plants and na-
tional monitoring programs." The 1972 FIFRA Amendments
expressly prohibit states from imposing any labeling or packaging re-
quirements in addition to, or different from, those required under the
Act.24 Courts have had difficulty, however, interpreting this prohibi-
tion because Congress additionally bestowed states with the power to
regulate the sale and use of pesticides.25
When balancing the federal government's right to regulate pesticide
labeling with states' authority to regulate sale and use of pesticides
under FIFRA, courts are split on the issues concerning when a state
action interferes with federal law.26 Specifically, courts have rendered
inconsistent holdings when considering whether the doctrine of pre-
emption precludes an individual from bringing state failure-to-warn
claims against a manufacturer which has complied with FIFRA label-
ing guidelines.2 7 One line of authority holds that a state law tort claim
for inadequate labeling is regulatory in nature and, therefore, pre-
empted by FIFRA.2' The other line of authority interprets FIFRA as
22. FIFRA also permits the EPA to register a pesticide only if the EPA determines
that "its labeling and other material required to be submitted comply with the require-
ments of this subchapter." 7 U.S.C. 136a(c)(5)(B) (1988).
23. H.R. REP. No. 100-939, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3474, 3476.
24. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, § 24(b), Pub. L. No. 92-
516, 86 Stat. 973, 997 (codified as amended as part of FIFRA at 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)
(1988)).
25. FIFRA expressly grants states the authority to "regulate the sale or use of any
federally registered pesticide." 7 U.S.C. 136v(a) (1988). See Chemical Specialties Mfrs.
v. Allenby, 744 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that FIFRA does not pre-
empt California's regulation of pesticide sale and use).
26. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text describing the two lines of
authority.
27. See Howarth, supra note 9, at 1303.
28. Several district court decisions have held that preemption exists under FIFRA.
See, eg., Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 558-60 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (hold-
ing that FIFRA preempts state law failure to warn claims but not claims based upon
state common law for sale or use of chemicals registered under FIFRA); Kennan v.
Dow Chemical Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 812 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (concluding that FIFRA
preempts state law negligence claims to the extent that a state court jury verdict would
have the effect of "regulating" the content of a warning label); Herr v. Carolina Log
Bldgs., Inc., No. 85-262-c, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 1989) (noting that state tort
claims may cause manufacturer to petition EPA to change warning label and holding
that FIFRA preempts plaintiff's negligent failure to warn claim); Watson v. Orkin Ex-
terminating Co., No. 88-2427, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS t7607, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 18,
1988) (finding that the practical effect of allowing jury verdicts against a defendant who
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allowing state law tort claims because these claims do not directly con-
flict with congressional goals.29 Despite this clear division on the
FIFRA labeling preemption issue, the Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed this issue.3°
In 1984, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rendered
the first decision on FIFRA's preemption of state failure-to-warn
cases3" in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 32 In Ferebee, the plaintiffs
sued the manufacturer of a herbicide which allegedly caused the plain-
tiffs' father's illness and eventual death.33 The chemical maker raised
preemption as a defense, claiming that FIFRA preempted claims based
on inadequate labeling.34 The District of Columbia Circuit rejected
this argument and held that FIFRA did not expressly or impliedly pre-
empt state failure to warn claims. 35
has fulfilled FIFRA's labeling requirements for a violation of common law duty to warn
would be to require the defendant to provide different warnings than those required by
the federal label).
29. See, e.g., Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348
(S.D. Ind. 1990) (finding that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire pesticide use
and labeling field, and therefore, FIFRA does not preempt state law tort claims for
inadequate labeling); Arkansas Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers,
Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1474, 1482-84 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding that FIFRA does not ex-
pressly or impliedly preempt state law tort claims against a pesticide manufacturer for
negligent failure-to-warn of harm that may occur from the use of a chemical).
30. However, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of use preemption. See
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2486 (1991) (holding that
FIFRA did not preempt a local government ordinance regulating the control of pesti-
cide use).
31. See supra note 10 for cases which have discussed other preemption issues liti-
gated under FIFRA.
32. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
33. Id. at 1533. The plaintiffs based their claim upon the alleged inadequacy of the
warning label of the herbicide, which the manufacturer registered pursuant to FIFRA.
Id. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the decedent's children based on the
theory that the manufacturer failed to label the herbicide "in a manner which ade-
quately warned that long-term skin exposure could cause serious lung disease." Id. at
1532. Therefore, the district court upheld the jury verdict finding the manufacturer
strictly liable for the decedent's injuries and death. Id. at 1532-33.
34. Id. at 1539. Defendant asserted that because the EPA approved the label, a
state jury may not find in a tort action that the label is inadequate. Id.
35. Id. In Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that implied preemption exists:
[W]hen there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, where
compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, where
there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, where Congress has
legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving
1992]
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The Ferebee court based its conclusion that FIFRA did not preempt
state law tort claims on several factors. First, the court found no ex-
plicit language in FIFRA mandating preemption of state law damage
actions.36 Second, the court considered a damage award to the plaintiff
compensatory in nature and not a direct regulatory command that the
manufacturer alter its label.37 The decision merely gave the manufac-
turer the choice of either continuing to sell the product and compensat-
ing for injuries or providing a more detailed label.38 The Ferebee court
reasoned that because manufacturers could comply with both state law
and federal law,39 an implied preemption' theory would not bar the
claim.41 Finally, the court noted that because protection and safety are
the goals of jury awards, state actions do not impede the objectives of
no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress.
Id. at 368-69 (citations omitted). See also Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,
491-92 (1987) (holding that the Clean Water Act preempts a Vermont nuisance law
because of the Act's comprehensive nature).
36. 736 F.2d at 1542. The Ferebee court further noted that FIFRA merely pre-
cludes states from directly changing EPA approved labels. IL See supra notes 4 and 6
for the statutory language of FIFRA.
37. Id. at 1541. While the court found that the verdict was not a direct regulatory
command, the court stated that jury damages resulting from a tort claim may "promote
legitimate regulatory aims." Id. The court found that a verdict against the manufac-
turer may impose burdens on the manufacturer because, if the manufacturer elects to
continue selling a herbicide, then the manufacturer must compensate victims for injuries
resulting from the herbicide's use. Id.
38. Id. This choice given to the manufacturer has appropriately been deemed the
"choice of reaction" because the manufacturer has the freedom to choose how to react.
See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627-28 (1st Cir. 1987).
39. 736 F.2d at 154. The court also stated that FIFRA clearly allows such dual
obligation upon a manufacturer. Id. While FIFRA does not authorize states to demand
additional labeling requirements, FIFRA does allow states to impose stricter restraints
on the use of EPA-approved pesticides than those required by the EPA. Id. Section
136v(a) of FIFRA provides that "[a] State may regulate the sale or use of any federally
registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation
does not permit any sale or use prohibited by [the Act]." 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988).
40. See supra note 35 for a list of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court to
determine the existence of implied preemption.
41. 736 F.2d at 1545. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984),
the Supreme Court looked favorably upon the reasoning that implied preemption is not
a defense when the defendant can adhere to both state and federal laws. The Silkwood
Court upheld a $10 million punitive damage award for the survivor of an employee who
died from plutonium exposure at a nuclear facility operating in compliance with federal
safety regulations of radiation releases. Id. at 245. The Court held that because paying
both federal fines and state punitive damages for the same incident is not physically
impossible and because imposition of punitive damages does not frustrate the congres-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol41/iss1/10
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FIFRA.42
Although the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was the
only federal appellate court to consider whether FIFRA preempts state
law tort claims,43 the issue continues to generate varying results in the
district courts.' For example, in Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,'
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
debated whether FIFRA preempts state law tort remedies46 and criti-
cized the "choice of reaction" analysis47 established in Ferebee.4" In
Mallinckrodt, the court equated FIFRA to the Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act4 9 which several circuits have held to preempt state
tort claims.5" The court opined that any state law tort recovery based
sional purpose to promote nuclear power, federal law did not preempt recovery of dam-
ages under state law. Id. at 256-57.
42. 736 F.2d at 1542-43.
43. See supra note 10 for examples of other preemption issues under FIFRA.
44. See supra notes 28-29 for a summary of district court opinions discussing the
issue. See also Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Federal Preemption of State Commonlaw
Products Liability Claims Pertaining to Pesticides, 101 A.L.R. FED. 887 (1991) (discuss-
ing the collection of cases which address the question whether federal law preempts
state law products liability claims).
45. 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
46. Id. at 406.
47. The Mallinckrodt court explained the hypocrisy of the "choice of reaction"
analysis as follows:
Once a jury has found a label inadequate under state law, and the manufacturer
liable for damages for negligently employing it, it is unthinkable that any manufac-
turer would not immediately take steps to minimize its exposure to continued lia-
bility. The most obvious change it can take, of course, is to change its label.
Id. at 407 (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627-28 (Ist Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989) (emphasis omitted)). See also supra notes 37-39 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the choices which the Ferebee court left open to
manufacturers.
48. 681 F. Supp. at 407. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Ferebee analysis.
49. 681 F. Supp. at 407. The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act is found at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1988).
50. 681 F. Supp. at 407. See, eg., Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 421
(5th Cir. 1989) (finding that plaintiff's claim that tobacco companies failed to ade-
quately warn was preempted by the Cigarette Labeling Act); Raysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act preempts a plaintiff's claim of inadequate warnings
against a manufacturer who complied with the Act); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825
F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding a suit for damages under common law inadequate
warning theory is preempted by the Federal Act where the warning complies with the
Act); cf Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 532 (1977) (holding that federal
1992]
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on inadequate labeling would hinder Congress' goal of providing uni-
form regulations of pesticide labeling."' Therefore, the court con-
cluded that because Congress has preempted state regulation of
labeling and warning, FIFRA bars recovery in tort based on negligent
labeling and failure-to-warn claims. 2
Although the Mallinckrodt court rejected the Ferebee preemption
analysis, other district courts have steadfastly adhered to the Ferebee
decision.5" For example, in Cox v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.," the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
adopted the traditional preemption analysis applied in Ferebee " and
criticized the reasoning behind Mallinckrodt."6 The Cox court found
that the manufacturer could be held liable for its failure to adequately
warn about the risks associated with the use of its pesticides despite
registering its product under FIFRA 7 Similar to Mallinckrodt, the
Cox court compared FIFRA to the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act.5 However, the court diverged from the Mallinckrodt rationale
by distinguishing the language of FIFRA from that of the Cigarette
labeling guidelines for bacon products preempt state law claims for inadequate label-
ing); Stewart v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.S.C. 1987) (finding that
Medical Device Amendment to Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which contained label-
ing guidelines for tampon boxes, preempted state law claims for inadequate labeling).
See generally Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Pol-
icy, and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. RPv. 897 (1988) (outlining
the ramifications of Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc. on the doctrine of preemption in
cigarette warning cases); Robert C. Carlsen, Comment, Common Law Claims Challeng-
ing the Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings Preempted Under the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act of 1965: Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
754 (1986) (arguing that preemption of cigarette inadequate warning claims impairs
congressional intent behind the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).
51. 681 F. Supp. at 407.
52. Id. at 407-08. The court further reasoned that "[a]llowing recovery under state
tort law where Congress has preempted state law would effectively authorize the state to
do through the back door exactly what it cannot through the front." Id. at 407.
53. See supra note 29 for a list of cases finding no preemption of state common law
tort claims under FIFRA.
54. 704 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
55. Id. at 87. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Ferebee decision.
56. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Mallinc-
krodt decision.
57. 704 F. Supp. at 87. Plaintiffs' decedent was a pest control operator who alleg-
edly developed lung cancer as a result of exposure to chlordane products manufactured
by the defendant. Id. at 86.
58. The Cigarette and Labeling Act is found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1988).
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Labeling Act. 9 For example, the court noted that the Cigarette Label-
ing Act prescribes the exact warning label on each package.60 To the
contrary, the court reasoned that Congress merely intended to set min-
imum standards for pesticide labeling under FIFRA6 ' because its lan-
guage was less structured than the Cigarette Labeling Act.
62
Therefore, the Cox court held that FIFRA does not preempt plaintiffs'
state law tort claims based on inadequate warnings.
63
In Papas v. Upjohn Co.," the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Ferebee
approach6" and endorsed the Mallinckrodt court's preemption analy-
59. 704 F. Supp. at 86. The Cox court also quoted from a footnote in Palmer, a
case used to support the holding in Mallinckrodt:
FIFRA, which applies to some 40,000 different herbicide and pesticide formula-
tions, imposes an entirely different type of regulatory scheme from that established
under the [Cigarette Labeling Act]. Under FIFRA, each manufacturer drafts a
warning label for each product for EPA approval. Thus, two manufacturers of the
same regulated product may use different labels of their own choosing, provided
only that they obtain prior EPA approval. ... In contrast, the [Cigarette Labeling
Act] explicitly (i) applies to cigarettes only; (ii) mandates the precise language of
the label; and (iii) prohibits any state from regulating any aspect of cigarette
warnings.
Id. at 86 (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 629 n.13). Therefore,
the Cox court found that the analogy to Palmer must fail. 704 F. Supp. at 87. The
Supreme Court has agreed to address whether state tort claims premised on a failure-to-
warn theory are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1987), cert granted, 111 S. Ct.
1386 (1991).
60. 704 F. Supp. at 86.
61. Id. at 86-87. The court was also persuaded by the fact that manufacturers sub-
mit their own labels to the EPA for approval. Id. at 87. The court reasoned that under
this scheme, manufacturers should have an implied duty to adequately warn the user.
62. Id. at 86-87. For other statutes expressly preempting state law, see Domestic
Housing and International Recovery and Financial Stability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-
17(a), 1715z-18(e) (1988) (stating that no "State constitution, statute, court decree,
common law, rule, or public policy" shall preempt federal law concerning mortgages
insured pursuant to this federal law); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, 1144(a), (c)(1) (1988) (preempting "all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State" from
interfering with any employee benefit plan described in this federal statute).
63. 704 F. Supp. at 87.
64. 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 1026. The Papas court reasoned that, although a manufacturer may be
able to comply with both federal regulations and state common law, damage awards
would interfere with the EPA's regulatory power because manufacturers would demand
labels that reflected the jury awards. Id See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Ferebee decision.
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sis. 6 6 The Eleventh Circuit applied a two-step analysis6" to determine
the pivotal question of whether Congress intended FIFRA to super-
sede state law.68 First, the court examined FIFRA's express prohibi-
tion of state labeling requirements69 but declined to address whether
FIFRA expressly preempts state law tort claims.70 The court con-
cluded that the federal government occupies the entire field of pesticide
labeling regulation.71 Second, the Papas court assessed the impact that
damage awards would have on the FIFRA scheme.72 A thorough
evaluation of the realistic effects of jury awards persuaded the court to
hold that state tort damage for inadequate labeling are regulatory in
nature and therefore impliedly preempted 3 by FIFRA because they
invade Congress' occupation of the pesticide labeling field.74
The Papas court expressed several rationales for holding that
FIFRA preempts state common law tort claims." First, the court
found that the federal government occupies the entire field of labeling
through its extensive labeling guidelines and restriction of supplemen-
tal state guidelines.7 6 Second, although the Eleventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that it might be possible for a manufacturer to comply with both
federal regulations and state common law requirements under the Fer-
ebee analysis,77 the Papas court explicitly stated that damage awards
66. Id. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Mal-
linckrodt decision.
67. Id. at 1022-26.
68. Id. at 1022 (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369
(1986)).
69. Id. at 1024. See supra notes 4 and 6 for the relevant text of FIFRA.
70. 926 F.2d at 1024. Although FIFRA precludes states from imposing additional
labeling requirements, the Eleventh Circuit refused to hold that FIFRA expressly pre-
empted state tort claims. Despite the court's view that the language "is a powerful limit
on state power over labeling," it declined to answer the question whether FIFRA's
language clearly expressed Congress' intent to preempt common law tort actions. Id. at
1023-24.
71. Id. at 1025.
72. Id. at 1024-26.
73. See supra note 35 for the Supreme Court's test to determine the existence of
implied preemption.
74. 926 F.2d at 1026.
75. Id. at 1024-26.
76. Id. at 1025. See supra note 6 for the statutory text regarding states' rights under
FIFRA.
77. 926 F.2d at 1026. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Ferebee decision.
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would interfere with the EPA's regulatory process.78 For example, the
Papas court found that the state scheme directly conflicted with the
federal regulation.7 9 The court determined that because the EPA con-
ducts an extensive cost-benefit analysis8' for each chemical before ap-
proval, a jury could not later determine that a chemical posed an
unreasonable health risk."'
Finally, the court found the state scheme to be an obstacle to attain-
ing Congress' objectives through FIFRA.82 Specifically, the court
found that jury awards based on inadequate labels would force manu-
facturers to either change their label or risk future suits and would
ultimately destroy label uniformity83 because warning labels would no
longer adhere to the same criteria from state to state.8" In addition,
manufacturers would press the EPA to change the labeling guidelines
to reflect jury awards.8
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the regulatory effects of jury
awards would allow juries to do what states are forbidden to do: im-
78. 926 F.2d at 1026. The Papas court relied upon the decision of a prior district
court in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. In Kennan v. Dow Chemical Co., 717 F. Supp. 799,
806-07 (M.D. Fla. 1989), the court held "that a state court jury verdict would have the
effect of 'regulating' the content of a warning label."
79. 926 F.2d at 1025-26. The Papas court specifically stopped short of stating that
all regulations of pesticides are preempted by FIFRA. Id. at 1026. The court noted
that 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988) provides states joint control with the federal government
in regulating the use of pesticides. Id. at 1025, n.5. See, eg., Wisconsin Public Inter-
venor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2486 (1991) (finding that because Congress has not
spoken on the issue, courts may only interpret section 136v(a) to preempt labeling, not
to preempt the entire field of pesticide regulation); New York State Pesticide Coalition,
Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that states have joint control
over regulating the use of pesticides except where the EPA has exclusive supervision
over labeling).
80. See Howarth, supra note 9, at 1323. The labeling process is a project between
the EPA and the manufacturer to develop a safe label based on extensive data. The
EPA then approves the label, and the manufacturer must comply to the letter. Id.
81. Papas, 926 F.2d at 1025. See Howarth, supra note 9, at 1323 (asserting that
juries do not possess the expertise necessary to provide safe warnings).
82. 926 F.2d at 1025.
83. Id. at 1025-26. See supra note 47 for a discussion of this analysis in relation to
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.
84. 926 F.2d at 1025-26. See also Howarth, supra note 9, at 1323-24. The author
stated that because states have different legal remedial standards, the judicial resolutions
will vary and frustrate Congress' uniform regulations. Id. Furthermore, the resulting
confusion will reach the consumers, whom FIFRA was designed to protect, because
several differing labels will flow through commerce. Id.
85. 926 F.2d at 1026.
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pose pesticide labeling requirements.86 Therefore, the court concluded
that a state common law action which possesses the same protective
goal as the federal law in question is preempted if it peruses that goal
by a method which countervails the federal methods.8 7
The Papas court reached the correct result for several reasons. First,
the court examined the precise language of the statute and properly
found that Congress occupies the entire pesticide labeling field. 8
Although the statute clearly precludes states from imposing label re-
quirements on pesticides in addition to those required under FIFRA,89
the court declined to hold that the provision expressly barred common
law actions.' Papas reached this conclusion because FIFRA does not
directly address whether a jury award for inadequate labeling91 would
produce the forbidden effect of enabling a state to "require" alterations
of pesticide labels.92
Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, the Papas court
properly analyzed the harmful effects that jury awards impose upon the
objectives of FIFRA.93 A jury award in favor of a plaintiff leaves the
manufacturer with unacceptable options. For example, the company
may (1) keep the federally approved label and remain liable for state
law claims for inadequate labeling; (2) conform its label to the safety
86. Id. The Papas court noted that although both federal and state law share the
purposes of protecting "man and his environment," jury awards would inject irrelevant
considerations into the EPA's evaluation and determination of safe pesticide labels. Id.
Furthermore, jury damages would second guess the EPA's labels in direct derogation of
FIFRA requirements. Id
87. Id. (relying on Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987)).
88. See supra note 70 and accompanying text for the Papas court's rationale in not
finding express preemption.
89. See supra notes 4 and 6 for the relevant text of FIFRA.
90. Papas, 926 F.2d at 1024. The court was mindful that Congress would have
expressly preempted common law actions if it had so desired. Id. (citing Taylor v.
General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 824 (1lth Cir. 1989)).
91. 926 F.2d at 1025. The Papas court did not extend its preemption analysis to all
state law tort claims. See Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 812 (M.D. Fla.
1989) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgement to the extent that the plain-
tiff based her claims on inadequate labeling, but denying summary judgement on plain-
tiff's claims based on the defectiveness or unreasonable dangerousness of the
defendant's product due to a defective design or manufacturing flaw).
92. See supra note 62 for examples of language which Congress employs to ex-
pressly preempt a state law.
93. See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors
which the Papas court relied upon in holding that the conflicts between FIFRA and
state common law mandated preemption.
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requirements of the several states, thereby undermining the stated pur-
pose 94 of FIFRA's guidelines; or (3) stop selling the product.9 5 The
District of Columbia Circuit in Ferebee acknowledged the burdens
placed on manufacturers in resolving these choices but wrongly con-
cluded that Congress would approve of such a result.96 The formalistic
"options" the Ferebee court proffers to manufacturers are realistically
not options at all. Manufacturers forced to defend themselves in tribu-
nals following the Ferebee analysis must inevitably adhere to the state
regulations vis-a-vis jury awards or risk suffering great financial
losses.97 The better reasoned approach suggested in Mallinckrodt, and
buttressed in Papas, eliminates this problem by eradicating state im-
posed burdens on manufacturers complying with FIFRA's labeling
requirements.9 8
The practical impact of the Papas court's preemption analysis wil
depend on either a decision by the Supreme Court or a response from
Congress. Due to the conflicting holdings of the District of Columbia
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, in addition to the split among district
courts, 99 the issue whether FIFRA preempts state common law claims
for inadequate labeling appears ripe for Supreme Court review. Be-
cause the Supreme Court has recently decided other preemption issues
94. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text for discussion of congressional
intent in passing FIFRA.
95. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (artic-
ulating the various choices a manufacturer may make with respect to labeling
requirements).
96. Id.
97. See Howarth, supra note 9, at 1329-39 (arguing that state law tort claims for
inadequate labeling should be preempted by FIFRA because of the harsh economic
effects of punitive damages).
98. The Supreme Court may be moving closer to this conclusion. In Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2487 (1991), decided after Papas, the
Supreme Court held that FIFRA does not preempt local government regulation of pes-
ticide use. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) did
not preempt the entire field of pesticide regulation, because § 136v(b) explicitly pre-
empted labeling. Id. at 2486. The Court found that a determination that § 136v(a)
preempted the entire field would render section 136v(b) superfluous. Id. At least one
district court has interpreted this decision to mean that section 136v(b) preempts state
law tort claims. See Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 90-1424, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10301, at *7 (D. Md. July 12, 1991) (following the Supreme Court reasoning in
Mortier to hold that a state tort claim alleging inadequate labeling of a pesticide must be
preempted by FIFRA as a matter of law).
99. See supra notes 28-29 for the conflicting district court cases regarding the
FIFRA labeling preemption issue.
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under FIFRA °° and has agreed to respond to analogous preemption
issues,1 ° 1 the Supreme Court may soon end the debate on state actions
which are preempted by FIFRA.
Norman E. Siegel*
100. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2487 (1991) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt
local government regulation of pesticide use).
101. The Supreme Court will review whether state tort claims premised on a failure-
to-warn theory are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 1386 (1991).
* J.D. 1993, Washington University.
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